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CRYOPRESERVED EMBRYO
DISPUTES: WEIGHING INTERESTS
REGARDING GENETIC PARENTHOOD
CORI SCHREIDER*
I. INTRODUCTION
A woman in her forties is diagnosed with breast cancer.1 Knowing she will
likely undergo chemotherapy treatment that has the possibility of rendering her
infertile, she and her husband decide to proceed with in vitro fertilization (“IVF”)
in order to preserve the option of having a family after her cancer treatment.2 The
couple signs a consent agreement, which states that in the event of divorce or
separation, any extra cryopreserved embryos will be discarded.3 The couple
divorces several years later,4 and the woman, although not infertile because of
the treatment, has only a 0–5% change of fertility due to her age, and wants to
use the embryos—a decision her ex-husband opposes.5 The court holds that the
contract stands, and the embryos are to be discarded, thereby eliminating what is
perhaps the only opportunity for the woman to ever have a biological child.6
This case, among many others coming through the state courts in the last
decade, begs the question of whether one has a right to be or not be a genetic
parent. One of ten couples in the United States is infertile, and assisted
reproductive technology (“ART”) has given hundreds of thousands of
individuals who lack reproductive capacity the opportunity to have genetic
children.7 Based on 2014 data from the Centers for Disease Control’s National
ART Surveillance System, there were 208,786 ART cycles performed at 460
reporting clinics in the United States.8 These cycles resulted in 57,332 live births

© 2017 by Cori Schreider.
*J.D., University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law
1. Findley v. Lee, No. FDI-13-780529, 2016 WL 270083 (Cal. Super. Jan. 11, 2016).
2. Id. at 1.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 2.
7. NATIONAL ART SURVEILLANCE, CDC (Mar. 7, 2016), http://www.cdc.gov/art/nass/index.html.
8. ART SUCCESS RATES, CDC (Feb. 24, 2016), http://www.cdc.gov/art/reports/index.html.
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and 70,352 live born infants.9 IVF is the process by which an egg and sperm are
combined manually, and the embryo is then transferred to the uterus.10
Often during this process more embryos are created than are needed.11 Dr.
Richard Scott, for example, who runs a fertility clinic in New Jersey, explained
that he creates around twelve embryos per couple, implants two to four of those
embryos, and freezes the rest in the event that the first attempt fails.12 Due to this
process, he stores up to 7,000 frozen embryos in his clinic at a time.13 Couples
can also keep embryos in storage not because they have excess embryos after
implanting a few, but because they want to be proactive in freezing their embryos
to use some time in the future if they think either party has a chance of becoming
infertile.14 Freezing embryos gives a 25-50% chance of pregnancy per frozen
embryo transfer, which makes this option more preferable when compared to a
woman freezing only her eggs without having them fertilized by sperm.15
However, cryopreserving these embryos to implant at some time in the future
can create a variety of complex questions regarding disagreements over their use,
disposition, or donation.16
State courts have applied a variety of legal approaches to settle disputes
about cryopreserved embryos. Part II of this paper will describe and evaluate the
different methods that courts use to resolve these cases, including the balancing
test, the contractual approach, and the contemporaneous mutual consent
approach.17 Part III of this paper will evaluate the arguments regarding one’s
right to be a genetic parent, and conversely one’s right not to be a genetic
parent.18 Finally, Part IV will propose that in the event of disagreement regarding
the future of cryopreserved embryos, courts should find in favor of the party
seeking to avoid procreation, except in circumstances in which either party lacks
the ability to have a genetic child by other means.19
9. Id.
PREGNANCY
ASS’N
(2016),
10. In
Vitro
Fertilization:
IVF,
AM.
http://americanpregnancy.org/infertility/in-vitro-fertilization/.
11. Id. (The number of embryos implanted usually depends on the number of eggs collected and
maternal age, since the rate of implantation decreases and women age. Thus, doctors will generally create
more embryos than are needed.).
12. Daniel Schorn, A Surplus of Embryos, CBS NEWS (Feb. 9, 2006),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/a-surplus-of-embryos/.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Findley, supra note 1 (Findley and Lee decided to freeze their embryos when they found
out that Lee was diagnosed with breast cancer and would have to undergo chemotherapy treatment that
could render her infertile).
15. Egg & Embryo Freezing, COLUMBIA DOCTORS CENTER FOR WOMEN’S REPRODUCTIVE CARE,
http://columbiafertility.org/fertility-services/fertility-preservation/#.VxmKfZMrK8U (last visited Dec. 1,
2017).
16. Meagan R. Marold, Ice, Ice, Baby! The Division of Frozen Embryos at the Time of Divorce, 25
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L. J. 179, 181 (2014).
17. See infra, Part II.
18. See infra, Part III.
19. See infra, Part IV.
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II. CURRENT APPROACHES TO DISAGREEMENTS OVER THE FUTURE OF
CRYOPRESERVED EMBRYOS
A. The Balancing Test
One model that courts have used to decide cases in which there is a
disagreement between parties over the future of their cryopreserved embryos is
the balancing test.20 This approach weighs the relative interests of each party in
using or not using the embryos. Davis v. Davis was the first case of this kind to
reach a state supreme court.21 The Davises were a couple who had cryopreserved
embryos after years of unsuccessfully trying to conceive a child via intercourse.22
When the couple separated, the husband sought to dispose of the embryos, while
the wife preferred to donate them to another couple in need.23 The court engaged
in a substantial analysis of Mr. Davis’ testimony, in which he described in detail
how he was affected by his parents’ divorce, and that he had suffered
tremendously from the absence of his father in his life.24 He connected this with
his opposition to embryo donation: that the recipient couple may divorce, leaving
“his” child in a single-parent setting, which, based only on his own experiences,
he finds unfavorable.25
The court held in favor of the husband, ruling that in these situations the
party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail.26 While this “obviously,” (to
the court) outweighs Mrs. Davis’ interest in donation, the court does not clearly
determine if it would have reached the same outcome if Mrs. Davis wanted the
embryos for herself.27 The court does signal that the case would be “closer,” but
only if Mrs. Davis could not achieve parenthood “by any other reasonable
means.”28 This analysis suggests that in weighing competing interests, the court
will put the most weight on an individual’s opposition to genetic parenthood.29
However, even this does not seem to be a blanket rule, as the court still analyzed
Mr. Davis’ psychological reasoning for opposing the use of the embryos, which
suggests that his motives were also important to the court’s decision.30
20. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 288 (Tenn. 1992); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001).
21. Ellen Waldman, The Parent Trap: Uncovering the Myth of “Coerced Parenthood” in Frozen
Embryo Disputes, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1021 (2004).
22. Davis, 842 S.W.2d.
23. Id. At 589–590.
24. Id. At 604.
25. Id.
26. Id. At 602.
27. Id.
28. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 602.
29. Id. at 604 (stating that, while Mrs. Davis’ interests are not insubstantial, “we can only conclude
that Mary Sue Davis’s interest in donation is not as significant as the interest Junior Davis has in avoiding
parenthood).
30. Id. (discussing Mr. Davis’ history of “problems” caused by separation from his parents).
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Ultimately, this is a fact-specific approach where the court must delve in to the
interests and intent of both parties.
In a more recent decision, Reber v. Reiss, the court engages in the analysis
that was discussed hypothetically in Davis.31 The wife was diagnosed with breast
cancer and decided to undergo IVF treatment in order to preserve the wife’s
ability to conceive a child after chemotherapy.32 When the parties separated, the
wife sought all of the embryos for implantation.33 The husband opposed, arguing
that it is against Pennsylvania public policy to force him to procreate with his
wife.34 Because the wife was now infertile, and created the embryos with her
impending infertility in mind, the court held that the balancing of the interests
tipped in her favor.35
While balancing the relative interests of the parties seems like a rational
way to deal with the complex problem of frozen embryo disputes, there are
several drawbacks to this approach. First, it lacks predictability, which could
result in even more litigation. Because the court fails to set out a determinative
standard by which it will rule in these disagreements, couples have little incentive
to think about the future of their cryopreserved embryos when first deciding to
undergo IVF, and possibly more incentive to bring their disputes to the courts.
Additionally, the court in Davis made a seemingly subjective determination
regarding the psychological impact that having a genetic child would have on
Mr. Davis.36 Another court may not have found the story of his troubled
childhood so convincing.
Conversely, this approach is persuasive because it acknowledges the fact
that decisions regarding relationships and family rearing are deeply personal and
subject to change.37 By balancing interests at the time when the parties are
actually making the decision about whether or not to use embryos, they are not
forcing parties to be bound by decisions they may have made via contract in the
past.
B. The Contractual Approach
In stark contrast to the balancing approach is the contractual approach, in
which written agreements executed by the parties regarding the disposition of
their embryos are presumed binding, so long as they are reasonable and

31. 42 A.3d 1131 (2012).
32. Id. at 1133.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1142.
36. Id. (relying on testimony about childhood trauma related to the divorce of his parents and being
raised by his aunt).
37. See, e.g., Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597 (“we recognize that life is not static, and that human emotions
run particularly high when a married couple is attempting to overcome infertility problems”).
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unambiguous.38 The advantages to this approach are numerous: efficiency,
consistency and potentially less likely to result in litigation.39 The contractual
approach was first articulated by the New York Court of Appeals in Kass v.
Kass.40 In this case, the parties signed consent forms before undergoing IVF,
indicating their mutual agreement to dispose of the embryos in the event that they
could not agree on whether or not to use them.41 When Mrs. Kass changed her
mind and requested possession of the embryos so that she could have them
implanted, Mr. Kass opposed.42 However, the court held that the embryos should
be destroyed, because the agreement was unambiguous as to the parties’ intent
and thus binding.43 Despite the fact that one dissenting judge to the opinion found
that it was more of an informal “informed consent” that failed to provide an
unambiguous statement of intent, the court relied on the fact that the parties’
intent was not only clear, but also mutual, and must be “scrupulously honored.”44
In another case, J.B. v. M.B., the couple signed a consent form prior to
undergoing IVF treatment.45 This form, in relevant part, stated that the couple
agrees that all “control, direction, and ownership of [the] tissues will be
relinquished to the IVF program under the following circumstances: 1. A
dissolution of our marriage by court order, unless the court specifies who takes
control and direction of the tissues. . .”46 The couple divorced, and the man
sought to donate the embryos to an infertile couple.47 The court held that the
existence of a valid, unambiguous agreement at the time of the IVF process
setting out the parties’ intention should guide the decision.48 Citing the Kass
court, the court pointed out the benefits of enforcing contracts in this context,
even when weighed against public policy concerns.49
Jurisdictions that have adopted the contractual approach to embryo disputes
are placing an emphasis on the ability of competent adults to make advance
decisions regarding their reproductive abilities,50 while simultaneously failing to
38. See e.g., Kass v. Kass, 91 N.Y.2d 554 (1998).
39. Noel A. Fleming, Navigating the Slippery Slope of Frozen Embryo Disputes: the Case for a
Contractual Approach, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 354 (2002).
40. Kass v. Kass, 235 A.D.2d 150 (N.Y. 1998).
41. Id. at 152.
42. Id. at 153.
43. Id. at 161.
44. Id. at 162.
45. 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001).
46. Id. at 710.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 715.
49. Id. at 713 (stating that there is even room for reconsideration if there is a disagreement as to the
disposition of the embryos. In that case, the court says that they can engage in an evaluation of the interests
of both parties; though, generally, the party wishing not to become a genetic parent will usually prevail).
50. Shirley Darby Howell, The Frozen Embryo: Scholarly Theories, Case Law, and Proposed State
Regulation, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 407 (2013).
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recognize the uncertainty of what may happen in the future.51 When couples are
deciding to undergo IVF, they are likely hopeful for their future together and
with a child, unable to realistically imagine a situation in which their marriage
fails. Anne Drapkin Lyerly, M.D., a professor of obstetrics and gynecology at
Duke University Medical Center, summarized these feelings stating that “when
you’re pouring your money, your heart, and your soul into creating an embryo
and creating a life, the last thing you want to think about is how you’re going to
dispose of it.”52
One study quantified these feelings by surveying 2,210 patients from nine
geographically diverse fertility clinics across the United States.53 The purpose
was to asses decisional conflict, which the study defined as “the extent to which
patients with cryopreserved embryos reported personal uncertainty about
disposition decisions and related deficits in knowledge and values clarity.”54 The
results revealed that parties felt “anguished” when presented with the decision of
what to do with frozen embryos.55 In fact, amongst patients who already
successfully had a child through IVF, 40% could not even make a decision
regarding of disposition of their excess embryos.56 The study ultimately revealed
high rates of decisional conflict, and even more significantly, that “individuals’
attitudes about embryos change considerably over time.”57 Similarly, in another
study coming out of the University of California, researchers found that 72% of
surveyed couples were undecided about the fate of their stored embryos.58
Such evidence reveals that contracts and consent forms cannot be relied
upon for a number of reasons. First, individuals’ attitudes about embryos often
dramatically change over time, evidenced by the fact that decisional conflict was
higher for patients who were further along in the course of treatment.59 Lower
decisional conflict at the time of actually completing the disposition agreement
compared with higher decisional conflict later in the process reveals the need to

51. For instance, if one party loses their last chance to become a genetic parent due to the terms of
the contract. Id.
52. Laura Beil, What Happens to Extra Embryos After IVF?, CNN (Sept. 1, 2009),
http://www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/09/01/extra.ivf.embryos/.
53. A.D. Lyerly, S. Nakagawa, & M. Kuppermann, Decisional conflict and the Disposition of Frozen
Embryos: Implications for Informed Consent, 26 OXFORD J. 3 (Nov. 2010),
http://humrep.oxfordjournals.org/content/26/3/646.full.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See Beil, supra note 52.
59. See Lyerly et al., supra note 53 (stating that patients surveyed varying times throughout the IVF
process had changing opinions regarding the status of any excess embryos).
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revisit the discussion about disposition preferences throughout the IVF treatment
rather than only at the beginning.60
Courts have also held that upholding such agreements are contrary to public
policy. In re Marriage of Witten, the court explained that, “to strike down a
contract on public policy grounds, we must conclude that the preservation of the
general public welfare. . .outweigh[s] the weighty societal interest in the freedom
of contract.”61 The Iowa state Supreme Court ultimately found that both case law
and statutes regarding decisions involving family relationships are emotional
ones that are subject to change, and therefore it would be against public policy
to enforce such agreements.62 The court explained that they have generally been
reluctant to become involved in “intimate questions inherent in personal
relationships,” and the decisions over embryos in the face of divorce falls under
that category.63 Thus, while some sort of consent form, and perhaps even
counseling, should be mandatory simply to set out expectations of the treatment
for the parties, they should not necessarily be legally binding in the face of a later
disagreement.
C. The Contemporaneous Mutual Consent Approach
This model is similar to the contractual approach in the way that, rather than
balancing the interests of one party against another, it emphasizes the importance
of both parties making decisions about the future of the cryopreserved embryos
together.64 However, unlike the contractual approach, it also addresses the
difficulty of being able to predict what may happen in the future, prior to
undergoing IVF.65 Under this theory, both parties must agree to all decisions as
to the disposition, donation, or implantation of embryos at the actual time when
they are making the decision to implant, donate or discard excess embryos, rather
than only before beginning IVF treatment in the first place. Otherwise, the
embryos will simply remain frozen until a decision is reached.66
In A.Z. v. B.Z., for example, a married couple conceived a child through
IVF, and the remaining embryos from the process were frozen for potential future
use.67 The parties separated several years later, and the husband filed a motion to
60. Id. (revealing that higher decisional conflict among patients not intending to become pregnant
highlights the need to discuss disposition preferences throughout the process rather than only before the
process begins).
61. In re the Marriage of Arthur Lee Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 780 (Iowa, 2003).
62. Id. For example, Iowa law imposes a seventy-two hour waiting period after the birth of a child
before the biological parents may release parental rights. Iowa Code § 600A.4(2)(g) (July 1, 2013).
63. In re the Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 781.
64. See, e.g., Melissa Boatman, Bringing up Baby: Maryland Must Adopt an Equitable Framework
for Resolving Frozen Embryo Disputes after Divorce, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 285, 292 (2008).
65. Id. at 293.
66. Id.
67. 725 N.E.2d 1051 (2000).
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obtain an injunction against the wife from using the remaining embryos.68
Despite the existence of several consent forms signed at the time of the IVF
process, the court held that they refused to enforce any such agreement that
would compel one party to become a parent against his or her will.69 The court
describes this as “forced procreation,” which would violate public policy and is
therefore “not amendable to judicial enforcement.”70 In In re the Marriage of
Witten, the court similarly held that the embryos could not be disposed of unless
they reach an agreement.71 While the court did hold that disposition agreements
generally do not violate public policy, in the event that there is a change of heart
by one party, the emotional nature of these decisions is such that the agreement
can no longer be upheld.72
This approach emphatically prioritizes the right not to procreate over the
right to do so, and fails to address the possibility of there being any situation to
the contrary. A significant amount of time could pass before reaching a decision,
which is of much inconvenience to a party seeking to have a child. There are also
downsides for the party seeking to avoid procreation. An individual who would
prefer the embryos be disposed or donated must continue to pay the costs of
storage while the parties work towards a decision, which can be as high as $40 a
month or even up to $600 a year.73 Ultimately, though, it seems unlikely that the
party wishing to procreate will consistently prevail when this approach is used.
The problem with this approach is best summarized by a footnote in Reber v.
Reiss: “. . .If the parties could reach an agreement, they would not be in court.”74
Despite the pitfalls of each of these three approaches, no court has yet to
come up with an alternative way to resolve frozen embryo disputes. Several
states have enacted legislation to try to help the problem. For example, Louisiana
classifies embryos as human beings and prohibits their destruction altogether.75
New Hampshire and Florida both require a prior agreement for IVF participants,
and NH additionally requires judicial preauthorization, as well as counseling
prior to undergoing IVF.76 New York and New Jersey have each considered bills
that have not yet passed requiring disposition agreements that must set forth the
parties’ wishes for the embryos in the event of death, divorce, or other changed
circumstances.77 Requiring agreements; however, still fails to address what will
68. Id. at 1053.
69. Id. at 1060.
70. Id.
71. In re the Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 781.
72. Id.
73. Kass v. Kass, 235 A.D.2d at 162.
74. Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131 (2012) (further stating that “this approach strikes us as being totally
unrealistic.”).
75. Kellie LaGatta, The Frozen Embryo Debate Heats Up: A Call for Federal Regulation and
Legislation, 4 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 99, 108 (2002)
76. Id.
77. Id.
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happen if there is a disagreement sometime in the future over the agreement’s
terms. Thus, this current legislation and the failure of the courts to come up with
a different solution leaves open the need for a more predictable way to settle
these types of agreements.
III. THE RIGHT NOT TO PROCREATE VERSUS THE RIGHT TO BE A GENETIC
PARENT
In any dispute over cryopreserved embryos, the court must engage in some
form of analysis in which it considers the importance of one party’s interest in
not becoming a genetic parent and the other party’s interest in becoming one.
This is the most obvious in the balancing approach, but also is apparent in the
others.78 For instance, the contractual approach generally prioritizes an
individual’s interest in not procreating, as most consent forms set out that
embryos will be disposed of or turned over to the fertility clinic in the event of
separation or divorce, and the court states that it is essential to uphold any
contract that is legal and unambiguous.79 In the contemporaneous mutual consent
approach, the court is even more clearly emphasizing the importance of a right
not to become a genetic parent, as one party’s interest in procreating will under
no circumstances be allowed if the other party objects.80 I argue that while the
right to not become a genetic parent generally should enjoy this prioritization,
there are situations in which the right to be a genetic parent trumps.81
A. The Right to Be a Genetic Parent
An individual opposing procreation would likely argue that even in a case
where the party seeking procreation cannot reasonably have a child by other
means, he or she still does not have any right to be a genetic parent. Radhika Rao
argues that while Skinner v. Oklahoma created a fundamental right to
procreation, this negative right to be free from state interference does not call for
“an affirmative obligation to assure the exercise of procreative choice by placing
its prestige and power behind the enforcement of preconception contracts.”82
Following this analysis, when parties have decided to sign preconception
contracts, the state cannot ensure that these agreements will be enforced all the
way through. An individual has the right to resist compulsory sterilization,
contraception, or abortion, but this right does not extend to an affirmative right
to use assistive reproductive technology.83 Furthermore, disputes arising out of
pre-embryo disposition agreements are between private parties – not state actors
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See supra, Part II.A.
See supra, Part II.B.
See supra, Part II.C.
See infra, Part IV.
Radhika Rao, Constitutional Misconceptions, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1473, 1484 (May, 1995).
Id. at 1485.
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– and thus it can be argued that it does not raise a constitutional issue that would
be governed by Skinner or other cases citing the fundamental right to
procreation.84
While these reasons may be compelling, and there likely is no constitutional
right to be a genetic parent in this context, there are still numerous policy-based
reasons as to why an individual who wants to have a biological child has the right
to have one, including 1. The personal decision made by many choosing to
undergo IVF, 2. Difficulties with the adoption process, and 3. Cultural and social
significance placed on genetics.
1. Making the Choice to Undergo IVF
Many couples choose to undergo IVF over adoption. IVF is a long, grueling
and emotional process, which shows the importance that both a man and a
woman place on having a child that is composed of both of their genetic
material.85 A doctor at the Center for Reproductive Medicine and Infertility at
the New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center described IVF as a “horrible
process,” and that “people don’t understand how horrible a disease infertility
is.”86 One woman who described her process with IVF in a New York Times
article said that she “had to get up at 5 every morning. . .you don’t feel so great.
Your ovaries are swelling up. You’re cranky, tired, you have mood swings,
you’re tense. And you want that baby.”87
The Findley v. Lee holding seemed to ignore this aspect of the IVF
process.88 The court suggested that because Lee knew that her marriage was
failing, she could have taken steps to preserve additional eggs, knowing that the
embryos she created with her husband would be destroyed if they did in fact
divorce.89 In addition to the problems inherent with the court assuming that Lee
knew her marriage was failing, it also seems improper for the court to impose
the burden on Lee to have her eggs extracted once again, given the physically
and emotionally draining process of doing so.90
Furthermore, a couple’s reasoning for deciding to go through IVF, rather
than deciding to not have a child, or to adopt, is a deeply personal one. One
mother described her main reason for undergoing IVF as “a compelling,
persistent desire to create a life, to bear and raise a child knowing that the one

84. I. Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights Not to Procreate, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1135, 1171
(Feb. 2008).
85. Since there are other avenues – like artificial insemination, adoption etc. See id.
86. Barbara Stewart, Tough Choices: In Vitro vs. Adoption, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 1995),
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/01/08/nyregion/tough-choices-in-vitro-vsadoption.html?pagewanted=all.
87. Id.
88. See Findley, supra note 1.
89. Id.at 34.
90. Id. at 37.
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reason he exists is because our love brought him into being.”91 She goes on to
explain that this is the same drive felt by couples or individuals who decide to
and eventually successfully adopt children, and the same as a couple who can
conceive children in any other matter.92 Though not quantifiable or rooted in law,
such a deep-seeded desire is compelling in allowing a party to have possession
of their embryos when that is their only chance of having a genetic child.
2. Difficulties With the Adoption Process
Additionally, there are reasons that lend support to the right to have a
genetic child that are not purely emotional in nature. While IVF is a long,
expensive process, adoption can sometimes be even longer and costlier. For
instance, for younger women, there is a high chance of achieving success through
IVF within three cycles, which can collectively be less expensive than
adoption.93 One single mother said she did not meet the financial threshold to get
approval for adoption.94 Adoption can also be a timely process, taking years to
bring a child home.95 Furthermore, there are possible barriers to adoption
depending on marital and socioeconomic status.96 For instance, public adoption
agencies will often give a child to a married couple first and a single person as a
secondary option.97 According to the National Committee for Adoption, for
every child put up for adoption, there are as many as 50-100 infertile couples
looking to adopt.98 Oftentimes, birth mothers who are a part of the process of
seeking a family for their child will express an interest for their child to be
adopted by a married couple, thereby disadvantaging single people.99
Private agencies are also available, but those too may have their own
requirements as to age, marital status and income, sometimes even preferring
particular religions.100 Thus, while IVF is difficult both physically and
emotionally, adoption, too, can be a long, emotional process. Therefore, the
availability of adoption does not necessarily make it a substitute for IVF; rather,
another alternative that is right for some couples, but should not be compelled
upon others when faced with infertility.

91. Julie Robichaux, IVF Versus Adoption: Why ‘Just Adopt’ Is Not the Answer, TODAY SHOW (Dec.
7, 2010), http://www.today.com/parents/ivf-versus-adoption-why-just-adopt-not-answer-1C7398701.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Kelly Wallace, Infertility: When Adoption is Not an Option, CNN (Apr. 27, 2015),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/23/living/feat-infertility-when-adoption-not-option/.
95. Waldman, supra note 21 at 1056.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1055.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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3. Cultural, Historical and Social Reasons for Wanting Biological Children
Couples may also want a genetic child for cultural or historical reasons.
Parents may want their child to share a common ancestry with them, if that
ancestry is of cultural significance, or where physical traits are essential to
cultural identity.101 One example of a link between genetic traits and cultural
identity occurs in the deaf community, one commentator observing that
“. . .perhaps the parents feel that deafness. . .is an asset—tough at times but
worthwhile in the end—like belonging to a racial or religious minority.”102 In
most cultures, the idea of a “blood bond” between parent and child is at least
somewhat significant historically, and therefore it is natural to want a child in
this way.103 While there is a compelling argument against genetic
determinism,104 genes still have a social significance, which in turn causes
individuals to put a high value on genetic traits.105 Ultimately, individuals
seeking to use frozen embryos to conceive a child would argue that these
emotional, social, economic and historical reasons are compelling for them to get
to have a genetic child over an opposing party under any circumstances.
B. The Right Not to be a Genetic Parent
However, there is also a strong public policy argument that there is a right
not to procreate, meaning that both men and women have an interest in not
having their genetic material used to conceive a child against their will. I, along
with many of the courts, believe that as a general rule, this interest is the most
compelling. This is because: 1. There is right against having one’s genetic
material used without their consent; 2. The potential for coercion into having a
social relationship with the child; and, 3. That an emphasis on the importance of
genetics supports the idea of genetic essentialism.
1. Using One’s Genetic Material Without Their Consent
An individual who does not consent to having a genetic child should
generally not be compelled into parenthood. More specifically, a man, for
example, has an argument that his sperm cells are his personal property and may
not be taken to create a child when he is opposed to having one. However, sperm
has not been classified fully as property. In Hecht v. The Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, the appellate court cited to Davis, stating that sperm should be
categorized as an intermediate position somewhere between property and

101. Fred Norton, Assisted Reproduction and the Frustration of Genetic Affinity: Interest, Injury and
Damages, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 801 (June 1999).
102. Id. at 804.
103. John Lawrence Hill, What Does it Mean to be a “Parent”? The Claims of Biology as the Basis
for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (May 1991).
104. See infra, Part III.B.3.
105. See Findley, supra note 1.
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persons.106 The Hecht court was referring to the analysis in Davis whereby the
Court refused to characterize pre-embryos as “persons,” but also refused to
characterize the Davis’ interests as a property interest under property law.107 The
Davis court engaged in an analysis based on a report of the Ethics Committee of
the American Fertility Society, identifying three possible positions to classify the
status of an embryo: 1. That a pre-embryo is a human subject after fertilization;
2. A pre-embryo has a status no different from any other human tissue; and 3.
adopted by Davis, that a pre-embryo is somewhere between numbers one and
two.108
In Hecht, Mr. Kane stored 15 vials of sperm in a storage bank, and not long
after, took his own life.109 There was existing evidence that indicated that Mr.
Kane intended his girlfriend, Ms. Hecht, to have his children with the sperm.110
However, when Ms. Hecht attempted to claim the sperm from the sperm bank,
the bank refused, and both the executor of Mr. Kane’s estate and Mr. Kane’s
children submitted petitions to have the sperm destroyed.111 The court analyzed
that due to the status of the sperm as not quite a person, but not exactly property
because of its potential for human life, they should be offered a particular
respect.112 Mr. Kane’s interest in the embryos were limited to “an ownership
interest to the extent that he has decision making authority over the disposition
of the sperm.”113 Thus, it is not a true property interest, but an interest limited to
one of decision-making authority.114 Therefore, Mr. Kane’s intent for the sperm
to be given to Ms. Hecht was to be adhered to.115 Had the sperm been a true
property interest, they would not have been awarded to Ms. Hecht, but rather
made assets of Mr. Kane’s estate.116
Some scholars have criticized the Hecht ruling, stating that failing to
recognize sperm in terms of property rights will lead to inconsistent results and
less predictability from state to state.117 While sperm, alone, leans more towards
property than personhood, when it comes to frozen embryos, these are even less
106. 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, 849 (Cal. App. Div. 1883).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 840.
109. Id.
110. Id. (Mr. Hecht’s will stated “I bequeath all right, title, and interest that I may have in any
specimens of my sperm stored with any sperm bank or similar facility for storage to Deborah Ellen
Hecht”).
111. Id. at 842.
112. Id. at 848.
113. Id. at 849.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 851.
116. Id.
117. Ernest Weintraub, Are Sperm Cells a Form of Property? A Biological Inquiry into the Legal
Status of the Sperm Cell, 11 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L. J. 1, 9 (2007) (stating that a failure to classify sperm
as property will yield unpredictable results across states).
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like a piece of property, considering the even greater potential for life when a
sperm cell is already joined with an egg during the IVF process.118 What the
Hecht and Davis analyses do lend support to is the fact that the intent of the
individual who uses their genetic material has an interest in its future.
It may be argued that there are similar situations whereby an individual’s
interest in their own genetic material does not always give them decision-making
priority. For example, it is established not only that a woman has the right to have
an abortion over the objection of the other party, but also that a woman has a
right to have a child over an objection from the genetic child who would prefer
she get an abortion.119 This could create a situation in which a woman has a child,
created with the sperm from a man who fully opposes having a biological child.
Thus, a woman who wants to implant a frozen embryo without the consent of the
man may argue that these situations are analogous: if a woman can have a child
without the consent of her husband when it is already implanted, she can also
have a child without the consent of her husband when it is not yet implanted.
Arguably, engaging in the IVF process is beginning the biological process of
having a child, and stopping it in his tracks is no different than compelling
abortion.120 Furthermore, while individuals may engage in intercourse without
the intention of creating a child, individuals who decide to undergo IVF are doing
so for the explicit purpose of eventually having a child, and therefore there is an
even greater interest in bringing that intention to fruition.
However, this argument is flawed for several reasons. The abortion cases
imply a right to be a gestational parent; they do not establish a right to be a
genetic parent.121 This is because the arguments in favor of a woman’s right to
an abortion absent the consent of the potential father are grounded in bodily
integrity.122 Along these lines, compelling abortion is different than compelling
the disposal of pre-embryos. For instance, I. Glenn Cohen makes the analogy
that while it could infringe on one’s bodily integrity to force a tube down one’s
throat to stomach pump up pills as incriminating evidence, the same concern is
not evident when a detective examines saliva on pills an individual has

118. IVF success rates have increased over time, while pregnancy rates for Intrauterine Insemination
Procedures have not. See In Vitro Fertilization, IVF – Advantages Compared to Other Fertility Treatments
such as Artificial Insemination, ADVANCED FERTILITY CTR. CHI. (Apr. 22, 2016),
http://www.advancedfertility.com/ivfchanges.htm.
119. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. (1976) (holding that that State
does not have the constitutional authority to give one spouse the ability to unilaterally prohibit the wife
from terminating her pregnancy); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (holding that
requiring spousal notification before obtaining an abortion placed an undue burden on the mother).
120. Ashley Marcin, Embryo v. Fetus: Fetal Development Week by Week, HEALTHLINE (Mar. 14,
2016),
http://www.healthline.com/health/pregnancy/embryo-fetus-development
(describing
the
differences between an embryo and a fetus, calling embryo formation the “baby’s basic foundation and
framework,” and the fetus as “growth and development.”).
121. Cohen, supra note 84.
122. Id.
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regurgitated without force.123 When the “integrity” is broken because biological
material is no longer attached to the body, there is no longer quite the same
justification for avoiding bodily invasion.124 Thus, a biological father’s interest
in not having a child when an embryo is created is not halted by a woman’s
bodily integrity as it would be if a biological father’s interest was in aborting an
already conceived fetus. Therefore, the holding in Hecht, where Mr. Kane’s
intent regarding the future of his sperm was adhered to, should be followed when
one party does not intend to have their genetic material used to create a human
life.125
2. Forced Social Relationships
A second argument for the right not to be a genetic parent are the
psychological implications once the child is born.126 There are varying degrees
of relationships that a parent may have with a child: a genetic/biological
relationship, a legal relationship and a social relationship.127 Derek Ettinger
describes the difference between genetic and social parenthood.128 He explains
that a genetic relationship does not guarantee any sort of normative relationship
between parent and child; and conversely, a genetic connection is not necessary
for the norms of social parenthood to exist.129 Rather, social parenthood is
defined through intentions, actions, and emotional and conceptual bonds.130 Take
adoption, for example. It is clearly the expectation that parents of adopted
children fulfil the same obligations as would any biological parent.131 On the
other side of the coin are sperm donors: individuals who technically are
biological parents, but are not expected to be social parents.132 One study
revealed that, of surveyed sperm donors, 80% would not want to be informed of
pregnancies that resulted from their donation, 88% would not be interested in
meeting their resulting offspring, and 60% stated they would not go forward with

123. Id. at 1157.
124. Id.
125. See Findley, supra note 1.
126. See, e.g., id. (where Findley argues that he was disturbed by Lee’s discussion of the future of his
potential child).
127. See, e.g., Derek J. Ettinger, Genes, Gestation, and Social Norms, 31 L. PHILOSOPHY 243 (May
2012).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., Tim Bayne, Gamete Donation and Parental Responsibility, 20 J. OF APPLIED
PHILOSOPHY 1 (2003) (rejecting the argument that gamete donors have parental responsibilities that they
“treat too lightly).
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the donation if they knew their offspring could find their identity later in life.133
This lends support to an argument that parental attachment is not biologically
rooted, or else more sperm donors would seek out the identity of their genetic
children.134
Yet, there is a clear and obvious difference between male IVF participants
and sperm donors, in that the party opposed to having a child is not anonymous.
Sperm donors generally do not have knowledge of where their genetic material
is going, while the men in many of the aforementioned cases may have
complicated relationships with the women who may gestate and parent their
biological child.135 Additionally, unlike sperm donors, most IVF participants
engage in the process with the expectation that they are to become legal, genetic
and social parents as a result.136 Furthermore, these participants are either
married or in some type of relationship at the time of IVF, and thus will always
have some sort of connection, even after separation. In Findley v. Lee, for
example, the woman looking to implant the cryopreserved embryos mentioned
that she would speak ill of the child’s father and his decision to not be a part of
the child’s life.137 This not only has the potential to psychologically impact the
genetic father, but also the child, who may feel neglected or unwanted.138
There may be an additional argument that legal and social implications do
not have to be an issue if the party seeking to implant the embryos allows the
other party to opt out, via contract, of legal, parental roles. This would include
the general parental obligations that exist after divorce or separation, like custody
and child support. While this would help to safeguard the opposing party, there
is ultimately no guarantee that the psychological impact would be any less. Thus,
the court’s decision regarding the future of cryopreserved embryos should
generally weigh in favor of the party seeking to avoid procreation.
3. The Case Against Genetic Essentialism
The final argument for the right not to be a genetic parent directly addresses
the argument in Part II.A by stating that there is no compelling reason to have a
genetic child. Genetic essentialism is the idea that our genes are the most
important part of who we are as individuals, ignoring the way that “our cells and
environments interrelate, the ways our physiological system functions as a whole

133. Bjorn Pedersen et al., Psychosocial Aspects of Donor Insemination: Sperm Donors—Their
Motivations and Attitudes to Artificial Insemination, 73 ACTA. OBSTET. GYNECOL. SCAND. 701, 702
(1994).
134. Id.
135. Waldman, supra note 21 at 1048.
136. See, e.g., Findley, supra note 1 (Findley and Lee were married when deciding to undergo IVF).
137. Id.
138. Id.
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organism, and the ways our minds and hearts affect our being.139 Though
deviating slightly from the main premise of this paper, the argument against
genetic essentialism can be well explained through the unfortunate situation
where there is a mix-up during the course of using ART.140 In Perry-Rogers v.
Fasano, one couple’s embryos (Perry-Rogers’) were implanted in the wrong
woman (Fasano).141 While Fasano agreed to turn the baby over to his genetic
parents, she sought visitation rights, which the genetic parents originally
consented to in an agreement, but then subsequently denied.142 When Fasano
sought to enforce the visitation agreement, the court held that she did not have
standing to dispute visitation of the child.143
By ruling in a purely procedural manner, the court failed to listen to any
claims about the best interests of the child, the child’s relationship with the
Fasano’s, or the role of the ART mistake in causing this dilemma in the first
place.144 The court essentially blames Fasano for forming a bond with this child
when she knew it was not genetically related, as evidenced by their different
races.145 Though not an easy, nor common, situation to resolve, this ruling is
problematic because it undermines the ability for a parent to form a bond with
her non-biological child.146 While the court acknowledges that a bond between a
gestational carrier and fetus is often formed while in utero, it fails to rule with
that idea in mind.147 Thus, the court impliedly ruled under a genetic essentialism
framework.
This is problematic for a number of reasons. While genetic information is
useful scientifically; i.e. in predicting and treating illnesses, what constitutes a
family is arguably not scientific at all.148 Genetics fails to address the role of
pregnancy and birth, as shown in the Fasano case, as well as the role of nurture
after birth.149 Furthermore, reducing individuals to their DNA can trap them into
feeling as though they have to act a certain way, which can stifle individuals in
reaching their full potential.150 While there is a history of tying biological
139. Leslie Bender, Genes, Parents, and Assisted Reproductive Technologies: ARTs, Mistakes, Sex,
Race, & Law, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (2003).
140. Id. at 2.
141. 276 A.D.2d 67 (App. Div. 2000).
142. Id. at 68.
143. Id. at 74.
144. Weintraub, supra note 117.
145. Id. (claiming that this case was solved simply by way of “race-matching” to determine parental
rights).
146. Bender, supra note 139 at 7.
147. Id. at 27.
148. Id. at 76 (arguing that there are not technical or scientific answers to complex human, familial
problems).
149. Id. at 3 (stating that genetic essentialism “renders all our ways of nurturing and being nurtured
by one another for naught”).
150. Id. at 42.
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reproduction with parental responsibility, the evolving definition of a family has
made this connection weaker.151 For instance, some states have begun to modify
the application of “traditional” parental preference when it comes to custody
disputes, such as by awarding custody of a child to a non-biological parent who
has performed all functions of a primary caregiver, even when it is against the
wishes of the legal caregiver.152 The fact that the courts are willing to progress
along with society shows that genetic parenthood is not necessarily prioritized
over other factors, such as intent and actions.
It may be argued that, as discussed in Part III A, a decision to have a
biological child is not based on scientific or even rational reasoning for wanting
a biological child; but rather, is purely emotional.153 A desire for a genetic child
may be simply based on a gut-feeling that having a child through the IVF process
is what is right for them, and they have a right to see that through.154 Furthermore,
there is often cultural and social significance associated with passing along
genetics.155 Without trying to undermine the validity of an individual’s emotions,
this feeling is still likely, at least in part, encouraged by societal “norms”—that
it is more accepted, or more desirable, to have a biological child, only because
more families have biological children than non-biological children.156 Even
Fred Norton, who argues in favor of genetic affinity, admits that it is partially
due to the “normative” experience of constructing a family unit that shares
identifiable traits is what makes it more appealing for many.157 Norton also
concedes that interest in genetic affinity is not functional, but rather purely
subjective and aesthetic; meaning, the role of genetics in personal identity is less
determinative, and therefore parental interest in affinity is more so related to their
children having symbolic, common traits.158 Therefore, while a parent’s desire
for a biological child should not be questioned, the reasoning behind the desire
may not be compelling enough to outweigh an opposing party’s desire to not
have a genetic child.

151. David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions between Legal, Biological and
Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 133 (2006) (though changes in parentage laws
have not changed fundamentally, some courts and legislatures have made attempts to “bend” traditional
doctrines to account for non-traditional parents).
152. Id. (describing a situation in which a lesbian couple had shared parenting responsibility equally.
When the couple separated, the court refused to give preference to the woman who had actually given
birth to the child, and treated both women equally).
153. See supra, Part III.A.
154. See supra, Part III.A.
155. See Findley, supra note 1.
156. In 2009, U.S. citizens adopted around 13,000 children from 106 different countries. OFF AND
RUNNING:
FACT
SHEET,
MD.
PUB.
TELEVISION
(Sept.
7,
2010),
http://www.pbs.org/pov/offandrunning/fact-sheet/.
157. See Norton, supra note 101.
158. Id.
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IV. GIVING PRIORITY TO GENETIC REPRODUCTION IN CASES OF LIMITED
REPRODUCTIVE CAPACITY
While courts have engaged in balancing tests, sometimes placing weight on
the desire of the mother to procreate due to a lack of alternative means of
procreation, no court has forthrightly stated that when a woman or man cannot
have a biological child by other means, they should always get possession of the
embryos when there is a dispute. This resolution is most appropriate for a variety
of reasons: First, it emphasizes the importance of genetic parenthood for both the
party wanting to procreate and the party seeking to avoid procreation. Second, it
creates predictability in these decisions, which can in turn decrease the amount
of litigation, and in most instances, also give the parties sufficient notice as to
the outcome of any future dispute, based on knowledge of their own reproductive
capabilities.159
A. The Right to Procreate and the Right Not to Procreate
Arguments for the right not to have a genetic child and the right to have a
genetic child are both properly addressed within this framework. As discussed in
Part III, genetic parenthood clearly holds importance in our society.160 This can
support both the argument as to why individuals seeking to avoid genetic
parenthood may feel so strongly about it; and, conversely, why those who wish
to implant the embryos also feel strongly about being able to do so. Allowing
disposal of embryos unless one party cannot have a genetic child by alternative
means somewhat addresses the interests of both sides. If the embryos are
disposed of, the party opposed to a genetic child will not have one, while the
other party, if they have reproductive capacity, can still go through the IVF cycle
with another partner or by using a sperm donor or an egg donor. This is not to
downplay the difficult and emotional process of IVF, especially for a woman;
however, as exemplified from the courts engaging in the balancing test, the party
avoiding a genetic child should generally prevail, and in the end, both parties can
eventually get what they want.161
However, the importance of a genetic child also lends support to an
individual wishing to have a genetic child when it is his or her only opportunity
to do so. Perhaps a woman has had cancer, and the chemotherapy rendered her
infertile.162 Or, she has undergone a hysterectomy and cannot carry a child on
her own. And, perhaps the embryos she created through IVF with her then-

159. Of course, reproductive capabilities are subject to change even after undergoing IVF, but in many
instances a couple is deciding to go through the IVF process because either party knows they are at risk
of becoming infertile due to illness, age constraints, etc.
160. See supra, Part III.
161. See generally, supra, Part I.A.
162. See, e.g., Findley, supra note 1.
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husband or partner was her last chance of producing eggs.163 It is only in this
situation that importance of having a genetic child outweighs opposition from
the other party. Furthermore, in this situation, under this potential solution, the
party seeking to avoid procreation would have no social or legal obligations to
the child. They would not be obligated to pay child support, have any sort of
custody, or any social role in the child’s life. As discussed in Part II, it may be
argued that this plan is not as full-proof as it may seem, as there are additional
psychological implications for the opposing party that cannot be “waived.”164
However, hopefully with these safeguards in place, the opposing party would not
feel as compelled to develop a social relationship as he/she otherwise would.
The court in Szafranski v. Dunston lays out the argument for priority in a
limited reproductive context.165 Although the court is engaging in a balancing
test, the analysis exemplifies why such cases should always come to this
resolution.166 In that case, Karla was diagnosed with lymphoma and expected to
be infertile as a result from the chemotherapy.167 She underwent IVF with her
boyfriend, Jacob, and created and froze three viable embryos.168 The couple
signed a consent form stating that, in the event of divorce or dissolution of the
marriage or partnership, and disagreement regarding the embryos, the couple
would donate the embryos to another couple.169 Their relationship ended; Jacob
wanted the embryos discarded, Karla wanted to use them.170 The court refused
to make a judicial determination that alternative methods of parenthood, like
adoption, offer an acceptable substitution to genetic parenthood, and ultimately
concluded that while Jacob’s interest in not being a biological parent should not
be undermined, Karla’s interests, given her ovarian failure, must prevail.171
B. An Interest in Predictability and Efficiency
Despite the Szafranski court reaching the right outcome, the way in which
it proceeded is problematic. The court engaged in a lengthy discussion of the
couples’ intent, the informed consent agreement, their oral agreement, and
Jacob’s reasoning for not wanting a child, including his fear that having a
biological child would prohibit him from finding love in the future.172 In Findley,
the court engaged in a similar analysis, and yet came to the completely opposite

163. Id.
164. See supra, Part II.
165. 34 N.E.3d 1132 (2015).
166. Id. at 1136.
167. Id.
168. They were in a relationship at the time, though both acknowledged that they doubted their
relationship would be long term. Id. at 1138.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1145.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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conclusion.173 This lack of consistency will not encourage couples to thoroughly
think through these types of situations before deciding to undergo IVF. Rather,
an individual may feel more comfortable making a spur-of-the-moment decision
to help his or her partner create a child, knowing that later on, if they want to
dispute the agreement, they can do so and get out of being a parent. Conversely,
having more stringent guidelines in place as to how disputes will be resolved will
force couples to think through these possibilities ahead of time.
Additionally, the Szafranski case took four years of litigation to reach a
final verdict.174 Pregnancy is a time-sensitive matter, and when one’s ability to
procreate is on the line, waiting for years for a court to subjectively decide on the
fate of one’s potential child through use of the balancing test is unreasonable.
Creating a more predictable ruling will help remedy this problem. First, couples
deciding to have IVF treatment will usually have notice if either party is infertile
or likely to become infertile. For instance, in both Szafranski and Findley, the
parties wanted to preserve embryos in the event that the cancer treatment took
away the women’s reproductive capacities.175 Thus, at this point, the men would
be aware that if they were to opposed to the implantation of the embryos at some
point in the future, the women would get to use the embryos if they so desired.
This will not always be the case, as a couple could preserve embryos for a variety
of reasons, and only later does one party become infertile; however, the outcome
would have to be the same. The reverse could also happen, where a woman
believes she will be infertile and then is found to be capable of producing eggs,
but again, this would not change the application of the rule—if the woman is
fertile, and the man opposes to her having his child, she will not be able to do so.
This predictability will allow couples to make more thoughtful decisions at
the time the embryos are created and cryopreserved, and therefore less likely to
litigate, knowing what the outcome will be. In the event that there is litigation,
higher state courts will be less likely to hear appeals of these cases, as long as
the lower courts follow the rule. The one aspect of this solution lacking in
predictability is in defining infertility. Ultimately, this burden would fall onto the
court to make a determination regarding at what point a woman or man is
rendered “infertile,” since with age-related infertility, and especially with men
this may not be so certain.176 While infertility may be more determinative when
caused by illness, it can be less so when it is age-related. According to the World
Health Organization, infertility is defined as “the failure to achieve a clinical

173. See Findley, supra note 1.
174. Tamar Lewin, Industry’s Growth Leads to Leftover Embryos, and Painful Choices, N.Y. TIMES
(June
17,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/us/embryos-egg-donors-difficultissues.html?_r=0.
175. See Findley, supra note 1.
176. See, e.g., Findley, supra note 1. (A fertility doctor determined that due to Lee’s age, her chances
of successfully conceiving a child were 0-5%).
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pregnancy after 12 months or more of regular protected sexual intercourse.”177
Yet, the American Society for Reproductive Medicine includes in its definition
that for women aged 35 and older, inability to conceive after six months is
generally considered infertility.178 However, neither of these definitions can be
sufficient when determining infertility when deciding the disposition of embryos
after divorce, since waiting that time period is unreasonable, nor would either
party have a sexual partner after divorce. Thus, infertility would need to be
determined by medical experts, and may not come down to a conclusive result
However, this one determination is still undoubtedly less complex than
engaging in an analysis of the parties’ reasons for and against having biological
children. Thus, an emphasis on efficiency, while also considering the interests of
the parties by understanding their reproductive abilities, strikes a balance
between the contractual approach and the balancing test. It may be argued that if
efficiency and predictability are the goals, then the contractual approach should
be the answer. However, as previously discussed, this approach undermines the
emotionally fluid process of deciding to go through IVF.
V. CONCLUSION
Decisions to start a family, especially when faced with reproductive
obstacles, is a deeply personal one. The assistance of ART is tremendously useful
to infertile individuals who want nothing more than to have a biological child.
However, uncertainty regarding the future of relationships and personal health
can bring about many problems between individuals who have frozen their
embryos to be used sometime in the future. Though ART has been around for
two decades, this is still fairly new technology and consequently, the courts have
been faced with new dilemmas surrounding its use in the past several years.179
Most jurisdictions have stuck to one of three frameworks for determining embryo
disputes: the balancing test, the contractual approach, and the contemporaneous
mutual consent approach.180 However, in order to properly address the interests
of all parties, the courts should adopt a more predictive and efficient standard.
Implementing a rule that the opposing party prevails, with an exception in the
case where one of the parties has no other means to have a biological child,
properly gives weight to both parties’ while also ensuring more thoughtfulness
in the parties’ decision-making and greater efficiency in the court system.

177. INFERTILITY
DEFINITIONS
AND
TERMINOLOGY,
http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/topics/infertility/definitions/en/.
178. DEFINING
INFERTILITY,
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https://www.asrm.org/FACTSHEET_Defining_Infertility/.
179. WHAT IS ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY?, CDC
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